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Abstract
Few studies have examined the relationship between on-the-job productivity and graduate education using single-firm
data. This paper studies the effect of graduate education on job performance using a unique micro-database consisting of
military officers. Supervisor ratings and promotion probabilities are examined for professional and technical officers
in the US Navy, a hierarchical organization with an internal labor market and up-or-out promotion policies. Single-
stage estimates indicate that, among those eligible to be considered for promotion to grade 4, the up-or-out point, those
with any graduate degree are more likely to be promoted. The effect is especially pronounced for those who receive
a degree via the Navy’s sponsored, full-time program. However, when instruments that are uncorrelated with promotion
are used to predict graduate degree status, the results suggest that a sizeable portion of the relationship between graduate
education and promotion is due to unobserved attributes that lead some people to attend (or to be selected for) graduate
school and to be more promotable. The selection-corrected estimates of the promotion effect of graduate education are
reduced by between 40 and 50%. [JEL I21, J24] Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Graduate education; Internal labor markets; Bivariate probit model; Promotion probabilities
1. Introduction
The earnings premium associated with postsecondary
degrees (Grogger & Eide, 1995; Cohn & Hughes, 1994)
is treated as the private return to education and is often
interpreted as a reflection of the differential in pro-
ductivity for those with more completed education. A
considerable literature, however, has questioned whether
the wage–schooling relationship is due to learning or to
sorting by employers (Weiss, 1995). Aside from the dif-
ficulty of determining whether current wages measure
productivity, a key issue in the debate is whether the link
between education and productivity is causal in nature.
Empirical studies using direct measures of productivity
have produced inconsistent results. Indeed, the direct
link between bachelor’s and master’s degrees and on-
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the-job productivity has not been studied extensively.
Given the growing emphasis in the work force on formal
education, additional research on the direct effect of
postsecondary education appears warranted. This study
examines the specific relationship between graduate edu-
cation and on-the-job performance for professional
employees in a single large, hierarchical organization.
The study examines the effect of graduate education
on job success using a unique micro-database consisting
of military officers. The data set contains relatively
detailed information on promotion outcomes, perform-
ance ratings by supervisors, and numerous background
characteristics such as academic achievement and early
career performance in the organization. An advantage of
the data set in exploring worker productivity is the
organization’s internal labor market characterized by a
vertical hierarchy with a well-defined personnel system.
Officer career paths are extremely structured: all officers
begin their careers in entry-level positions and possess a
454 W.R. Bowman, S.L. Mehay / Economics of Education Review 18 (1999) 453–463
bachelor’s degree; those with master’s degrees acquire
them after joining the organization; and most advanced
education is financed at least in part by the military and
is viewed as a form of professional education.
The research should shed some light on the potential
benefits of advanced education programs, for nearly all
large private firms provide educational benefits to their
professional and managerial employees.1 In addition, the
military’s personnel system mimics private firms in
many ways, so that studying military job performance
may provide information on the operation of internal
labor markets, including the promotion process and the
role of performance evaluations.
The next section of the paper reviews previous studies
that have dealt, directly or indirectly, with graduate edu-
cation and job success. We then describe the personnel
data used in the analyses, the Navy’s advanced education
programs, and the empirical strategy. Following that we
present estimates of the performance models. In general,
we find that graduate education improves measures of
employee job productivity; however, these effects are
significantly reduced in instrumental variable estimates
that adjust for selection bias.
2. Background
Only a handful of studies have analyzed the relation-
ship between human capital and job performance using
firm-level data. Wise (1975a, b) examined the starting
salaries, salary growth, and promotion probabilities of
managerial and professional employees in a single firm;
Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) studied current salaries,
salary growth, and the number of promotions over a
6 year period for exempt employees in a manufacturing
firm. Wise found that those who acquired graduate
degrees after joining the firm earned a 1.2 percentage
point premium in annual salary growth, but only if they
were ranked in the top third of their class. Promotion
probabilities were about 7% higher for those with
advanced degrees. Gerhart and Milkovich found that
type of degree mattered: an M.A. had a negative effect
on salary growth whereas an M.B.A. had a positive
effect.
Medoff and Abraham (1980) argued that earnings
should be compared only within grade levels due to dif-
ferences in the type of jobs across grades. After con-
trolling for grade level in their employee data from a
1 A 1986 survey of Fortune 1000 companies revealed that
98% of the 730 respondents had a tuition assistance program.
Two-thirds of the companies reimbursed employees for non-
job-related courses, especially if they were part of a degree pro-
gram (O’Neill, 1986). Also, an increasing number of firms are
setting up in-house ‘corporate colleges’.
manufacturing firm the earnings premium for a master’s
degree fell from 10 to only 1%. Moreover, while within-
grade earnings were higher for advanced degree holders,
measured productivity was not. Because only one-tenth
to one-fifth of the total return to education was due to
higher within-grade earnings, they concluded that mas-
ter’s degree holders earn more simply because at entry
they are assigned to jobs in higher grades. Introducing
controls for performance evaluations in the earnings
models did not move the education coefficients toward
zero, implying that differences in performance for those
with advanced degrees does not explain the positive
within-grade relationship between education and earn-
ings. They concluded that, within groups of comparable
jobs, there was no correlation between additional human
capital and performance.2
Woo (1986) also found that controlling for grade and
performance rating reduced the earnings premium for a
master’s from 7–25 percentage points to only 1 point.
Although salary growth rates for master’s degrees
exceeded those for bachelor’s, Woo found an M.B.A had
no effect on within-grade performance ratings, and a
non-business degree had a negative effect. Further, the
probability of promotion was significantly lower for both
types of master’s degrees. Since performance ratings and
promotion are superior to earnings as measures of pro-
ductivity, she concluded that a graduate degree does not
enhance employee productivity.3
Several explanations have been offered for the finding
that earnings appear to increase with human capital vari-
ables, such as advanced degrees, but productivity does
not. Weiss and Landau (1985) point out that the distri-
bution of workers on a given job is truncated from above
and below; truncation occurs because various criteria
must be met initially to be assigned to the job and to
keep it, and other criteria must be met (such as higher
productivity) to get promoted. Hellerstein and Neumark
(1995) note that the productivity indicators in these stud-
ies are occupation- and job-level-specific so that pro-
ductivity and education are examined only for workers
who remain in an occupation or a job. Such workers may
be unrepresentative in the sense that they do not follow
the normal life cycle pattern that involves occupational
2 This conclusion also applied to other human capital meas-
ures, namely pre-company experience and tenure at the firm,
which were the primary focus of their papers. These basic
results were echoed by Dunson (1985) who used data on federal
professional and administrative workers.
3 Bartel (1995) used a company database to estimate the
effects of company-sponsored formal training for professional
employees on wage growth and performance ratings. Using an
instrumental variables strategy she found that the incidence and
duration of formal training increased salary growth rates and
performance ratings.
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change and promotion.4 Finally, Medoff and Abraham-
type studies examine salary and grade level after entry.
If advanced degree holders start at higher grades, sub-
sequent promotion opportunities will tend to be less
numerous and to occur at longer time intervals.
These early studies also provide little information on
the basic structure of the personnel systems of the firms
studied. For example, performance measures are strati-
fied by grade level but it is not known how workers are
distributed across current or entry grades by education.
Similarly, no information is provided on the firms’ edu-
cation programs, including the timing and source of
funding of advanced education, the number of employees
who benefitted from these programs and how they were
selected, and the specificity of the investments. Finally,
the analyses fail to discuss the eligibility of workers to be
considered for promotion and promotion rates by grade.
Without knowledge of a firm’s career ladders, it is diffi-
cult to identify the pool of personnel eligible and quali-
fied for promotion within a given grade. Consequently,
promotion rates are likely to be mismeasured. In short,
these studies do not attempt to integrate the structure of
the firm, career paths and career ladders, or the pro-
motion process into the analysis.
3. Data and estimation strategy
The objective of this study is to examine job success
for Navy officers. The study concentrates on promotion
as the performance measure; however, information on
supervisor evaluations is also used. The promotion
model focuses on promotion to grade 4, which is the first
significant control point in an officer’s career and
involves an up-or-out decision. All officers enter the
military at grade 1 (ensign), and promotions to grade 2
(lieutenant j.g.) and grade 3 (lieutenant) are virtually
automatic. Promotion to grade 3 occurs at 4 years of ser-
vice; up-or-out review is at 10 years.5 Most officers
4 A sizeable literature has also emerged that attempts to
explain the broader puzzle of the positive relationship between
experience and earnings versus the negative relationship
between experience and productivity. Bishop (1987) discusses
numerous reasons why the optimal wage-setting rule for a firm
will result in wages that only partially adjust to measured differ-
ences in productivity. Hutchens (1989) points out that workers
who remain in a given job grade for a long time do so because
they have poor evaluations. Lazear (1981) argues that the use
of implicit, delayed payment contracts makes it impossible to
closely link earnings profiles with the time path of productivity.
The various contract and other theories are summarized in Kot-
likoff and Gokhale (1992).
5 For a fuller description of military officer personnel sys-
tems, see Rand Corporation (1994).
attend graduate school prior to grade 4, and the majority
utilize the Navy’s funded program.
The basic information is drawn from the Navy’s Pro-
motion History File, which provides background infor-
mation on all officers reviewed for promotion between
1985 and 1990.6 This file is augmented with supervisor
evaluations (fitness reports) prior to the grade 4 pro-
motion review. Officers are classified into two occu-
pational categories—line and staff. Line specialists work
in the primary operational areas of the Navy: aviation,
ship operations, and submarine operations. Staff officers
perform primarily administrative functions. Within each
specialty the set of jobs performed, the level of difficulty
of the jobs, and career paths are similar; also, super-
visors’ evaluations and promotion are based solely on
performance within that specific community.7 After
deleting observations with missing data, the merged data
file contains 4230 line and 2353 staff officers who were
reviewed for promotion to grade 4 between 1985 and
1990.
The specification of the performance models recog-
nizes the military’s internal labor market, which is
characterized by a vertical hierarchy, no lateral entry,
administrative pay setting, and up-or-out promotion. The
organization uses contests (or tournaments) to motivate
work effort due to the cost of observing and monitoring
individual effort (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). In a contest,
the organization ranks workers based on evaluations and
rewards them on the basis of relative (rather than
absolute) performance. The contest determines who is
promoted to the next higher rank (Rosen, 1992). Individ-
ual promotion probabilities also depend on the aggregate
promotion rate to grade 4. The aggregate rate depends
on the number of vacancies in the next higher grade at
time t, which depends in turn on the number who survive
into grade i at t, as well as on survival rates at all higher
grades and years of service (Asch & Warner, 1994).
Thus, an individual’s promotion probability, pit, in this
type of organization depends on the aggregate promotion
rate, p*, the individual’s own ability (ai) and effort (ei)
and the abilities and work effort of all others in grade i
at time t, (ao,eo); that is, pit 5 pit (ait,eit,ao,eo,p*).
Two important implications of hierarchical organiza-
tional forms are that the direct and indirect span of con-
trol increases geometrically with rank and that command
decisions at higher ranks also have a publicness element.
6 The data represent ‘quasi-cohorts’, a set of employees who
enter a specific state, such as grade 3, over some period. These
groups were reviewed for promotion to grade 4 between 1985
and 1990 and thus represent entry cohorts for 1976–1980. We
concentrate on this period because it preceded the personnel
turbulence associated with the military downsizing during the
1990s.
7 Medical and legal specialities are excluded because officers
in those fields often enter the Navy with master’s degrees.
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Individual productivity thus varies positively with rank
and assignment policies must allocate the most capable
individuals to the higher-ranking positions (Rosen,
1992). Promotion to grade 4 also effectively involves a
tenure decision. The use of up-or-out underscores the
length of reach of decisions at the next higher level, the
potential cost of mis-assigning individuals with poor
prospects to the upper ranks, and the importance of a
tighter screening of individuals to those ranks
(O’Flaherty & Siow, 1995).
4. Estimates of promotion models
The specification of the promotion model assumes that
relative performance depends on accumulated human
capital (Wise, 1975a, b; Bartel, 1995). Wise partitions
human capital into cognitive skills and affective skills.
The latter are based on work-related attitudes and attri-
butes such as perseverance, self-discipline, leadership,
initiative, and the ability to cooperate, which is
especially important in the military’s team production
environment. In the empirical model below, cognitive
abilities are specified as a function of college grade point
average, a technical undergraduate degree in science,
engineering or mathematics, or a graduate degree. Prox-
ies for affective skills are based on accession source—
the Naval Academy, an ROTC scholarship, Officer Can-
didate School (OCS), or the enlisted ranks. Naval Acad-
emy students effectively serve a 4 year apprenticeship
before commissioning and thus may assimilate more eas-
ily into the military’s team production environment.
Other demographic factors, such as gender and race,
are likely to be correlated with the accumulation of spe-
cific human capital, in part due to differences in occu-
pational assignments. Women for many years were
restricted from the line specialties, which offered the best
chances for acquiring firm-specific capital. Minorities are
also not represented equally in all occupational specialt-
ies, due in part to preferences and in part to academic
background. These differences in assignments and asso-
ciated opportunities for accumulating firm-specific
human capital may affect promotability both across and
within occupational specialty areas. Marital and family
status are captured by four categories: married with no
children; married with children; divorced with children;
and single, the omitted category. Finally, the Navy pro-
motes to fill vacancies so that promotion opportunities
vary from year to year depending on cohort size (supply)
and vacant slots in the next highest grade (demand). Four
fiscal year dummies are included to account for differ-
ences in each cohort’s aggregate promotion opportunity
(p*).
The first analysis concentrates on job performance
during the roughly 9 years prior to the up-or-out review.
Information from supervisor evaluations (fitness reports)
is used to construct a job performance measure. Even
though the evaluation form contains numerous elements,
most scores are highly inflated and there is little variation
across individuals. However, one element for which
there is significant variation and which has been ident-
ified as a valid measure of job performance is whether
the officer is ‘recommended for early promotion’
(Neumann, Mattson & Abrahams, 1989). We use the per-
centage of all evaluations during the pre-up-or-out por-
tion of one’s career on which the officer received an
early-promote recommendation as a measure of job per-
formance.8
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for key variables
by officer specialty and degree status. About 18% of the
officers reviewed for promotion to grade 4 possess an
advanced degree. The unadjusted promotion differential
favors those with a degree by 10 percentage points for
line officers and by 14 points for staff officers. The pro-
portion of early evaluations carrying the early-promote
recommendation is 11–12 percentage points higher for
those with M.A. degrees. For most other variables, dif-
ferences in the means between those with and those with-
out degrees appear slight due in part to the fact that the
sample is restricted to officers whose academic back-
ground makes them eligible to attend graduate school.
We first estimate the probit promotion model under
the assumption that graduate education is exogenous.
The probit results for line officers appear in Table 2 and
for staff officers in Table 3. Columns 1–4 of Tables 2
and 3 present alternative specifications of the promotion
model to evaluate the sensitivity of the effect of graduate
education to an increasingly inclusive set of controls.
The estimated coefficients of any M.A. degree in Tables
2 and 3 have the expected signs and generally are statisti-
cally significant. Among the demographic variables,
those who are female, younger, and married, with or
without children, are more likely to be promoted. Min-
orities are less likely to be promoted, but the precision
of this estimate falls in the fuller specifications in column
4. The promotion probability for Naval Academy gradu-
ates (the omitted category) is significantly higher than
for the other accession sources, which supports the
notion that Academy graduates enter the Navy with a
greater stock of human capital and possibly affective
skills.
The results appear to be robust to the different model
8 The advantage of this variable is that it provides a cumulat-
ive record of performance and it covers performance for a var-
iety of jobs and supervisors. Only a trivial proportion of officers
are actually ever promoted ‘early’ (ahead of their peers in the
cohort). Nonetheless, this recommendation on the evaluation
signals that the supervisor views the employee’s performance
as superior to his peers. Interestingly, this element mirrors a
question on the rating forms used by the private firm in the
Medoff and Abraham (1980) study.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics by degree status and occupationa
Line officers Staff officers
Variable Master’s No master’s Master’s No master’s
Promotion rate 0.86 0.76 0.84 0.70
Early performanceb rating (%) 36.22 25.63 36.54 28.77
Technical B.A. (%) 0.65 0.67 0.43 0.57
Grade point averagec 3.12 2.91 3.24 3.08
ROTC (%) 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.27
OCS (%) 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.42
NESEP (%) 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.13
Naval Academy (%) 0.41 0.37 0.12 0.18
Selective college (%) 0.51 0.55 0.65 0.67
Female (%) 0.02 0.01 0.22 0.18
Age 22.90 22.75 23.52 23.60
Married 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.19
Married with children (%) 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.49
Divorced with children (%) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Single (%) 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.29
Nonwhite 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06
N 841 3389 858 1495
aSample based on those reviewed for promotion at grade 4.
bPercent of supervisory evaluations that received an ‘early promote’ recommendation.
cSix-point scale: 0 5 0–1.89; 1 5 1.9–2.9; 2 5 2.2–2.59; 3 5 2.6–3.19; 4 5 3.2–3.59; 5 5 3.6–4.0.
specifications. In all specifications, the graduate degree
coefficient is positive and significant. The marginal
effect of an M.A. is 0.098 and 0.145 for line and staff
officers, respectively, which is nearly the same as the
unadjusted promotion differences in Table 1. Columns
2–4 reveal that the effect of graduate education is
reduced as additional controls, some of which are likely
to be correlated with an M.A., are included. The mar-
ginal effect falls to 0.057 in column 4 of Table 2 and to
0.089 in column 4 of Table 3, roughly a 40% drop com-
pared to column 1 in both tables. Also, inclusion of the
additional controls improves model fit, as the chi-square
for the log likelihood ratio rises significantly from col-
umn 1 to column 4. A person with a higher GPA has a
promotion probability that is about 5 percentage points
higher than one with a lower GPA; having a technical
undergraduate major makes no difference.
The specification of the single equation model is such
that the coefficients of the education variables will be
biased if the error term is correlated with the schooling
choice. Individuals are assumed to base attendance at
graduate school on the expected returns. The sponsored
program imposes a cost in the form of an added military
service obligation. Hence, those who accept funding
view the benefits (in the form of higher promotion prob-
abilities or better assignments) as exceeding the cost of
the additional service time; those who reject the program
probably do not expect to remain in the Navy owing to
superior civilian employment opportunities. The coef-
ficient of the M.A. will represent a bundling of pure edu-
cation effects and differences in the motivation and
career aspirations of individuals choosing to attend
graduate school. In addition, it is likely that the organiza-
tion uses information on job performance to select indi-
viduals for the funded program. The measured effect of
funded education will be biased upward if the organiza-
tion assigns more able persons to graduate school.
One technique for addressing the selection issue is to
include controls in the models in Tables 2 and 3 for indi-
vidual ability and the administrative criteria used to
choose officers for the funded education program. The
two most important selection criteria are academic back-
ground and early career performance, attributes which
are proxied by college GPA and early performance rat-
ings. College GPA will also index one’s cognitive abili-
ties. When these controls are included in Tables 2 and 3,
the coefficient of the M.A. drops by about 20% (compare
columns 2 and 4 to column 1 in both Table 2 and
Table 3).
The above approach attempts to deal with the selection
problem by conditioning explicitly on factors likely to
be correlated with ability and the likelihood of attending
graduate school. Even though these proxies have con-
siderable explanatory power, they may fail to fully cap-
ture individual ability and educational preferences. If so,
the disturbance term in the model will include the portion
of each person’s preferences for education not captured
by the proxy variables, which may be correlated with
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Table 2
Probit promotion models for line officers
Dependent variable 5 promotion to grade 4
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
Master’s degree 0.376 0.342 0.345 0.265
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.065)
[0.098] [0.087] [0.085] [0.065]
Female 0.710 0.628 0.636 0.502
(0.244) (0.246) (0.246) (0.249)
Age 2 0.064 2 0.064 2 0.074 2 0.071
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016)
Married 0.191 0.188 0.186 0.137
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069)
Married with children 0.260 0.257 0.255 0.252
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062)
Divorced with children 0.014 0.037 0.035 0.006
(0.164) (0.165) (0.165) (0.179)
ROTC program – – 2 0.275 2 0.266
– – (0.054) (0.059)
OCS program – – 2 0.038 2 0.104
– – (0.069) (0.074)
NESEP program – – 2 0.095 2 0.124
– – (0.119) (0.130)
College GPA – 0.183 0.175 0.142
– (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
Technical B.A. – 2 0.032 2 0.030 2 0.010
– (0.047) (0.049) (0.052)
Minority 2 0.227 2 0.164 2 0.181 2 0.103
(0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.115)
Early performance ratings – – – 0.009
– – – (0.000)
Constant 1.947 1.439 1.781 1.598
2 2 Log L 4289.0 4242.9 4215.0 3590.2
N 4214 4214 4214 4039
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; marginal effects in brackets. All specifications include fiscal year dummy variables.
the actual possession of a graduate degree. Our second
approach is to address this issue using the following
bivariate probit model:
Yi 5 xib 1 IGig 1 eyi (1)
Gi 5 Zia 1 eGi (2)
where IGi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individ-
ual attends graduate school and equal to 0 otherwise; Yi
is the latent value of being promoted; Gi is the latent
value of completing graduate school; xi is a set of indi-
vidual characteristics and Zi includes some of the charac-
teristics in x plus a set of instruments for graduate school
completion. We observe that Iyi 5 1 if yi > 0 and Iyi 5
0 if yi , 0; we observe that IGi 5 1 if Gi > 0 and IGi 5
0 if Gi , 0. We assume that both ey and eG are mean
zero, given x and Z and that they are distributed bivariate
standard normal.
To obtain the instruments we first estimate a probit
model of the determinants of graduate school attendance,
which assumes that attendance is based on expected
returns and individual characteristics such as sex, age,
marital status, and race/ethnicity. The cost of attending
graduate school varies across occupational specialties.
This is because in some specialties the career path allows
little time for leaving the operational environment, so
that there is a significant opportunity cost from attending
graduate school. In other specialties, the opportunity cost
of attending graduate school is high due to strong civilian
career opportunities. Thus, the selection model includes
dummy variables to control for sub-specialities within
the line and staff occupations.
Costs and benefits will also vary across individuals
within a subspecialty owing to one’s relative position
and long-term career interests. A proxy variable is avail-
able which indexes the individual’s (perceived) position.
Officers must keep placement officials informed about
career intentions, including whether they will attend
459W.R. Bowman, S.L. Mehay / Economics of Education Review 18 (1999) 453–463
Table 3
Probit promotion models for staff officers
Dependent variable 5 promotion to grade 4
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4.
Master’s degree 0.503 0.491 0.497 0.376
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.073)
[0.145] [0.141] [0.136] [0.089]
Female 0.161 0.141 0.181 0.160
(0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.097)
Age 2 0.036 2 0.037 2 0.036 2 0.036
(0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.018)
Married 0.314 0.319 0.308 0.227
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.104)
Married with children 0.201 0.205 0.185 0.106
(0.079) (0.079) (0.080) (0.089)
Divorced with children 0.107 0.112 0.107 0.163
(0.184) (0.184) (0.185) (0.224)
ROTC – – 2 0.271 2 0.155
– – (0.091) (0.103)
OCS – – 2 0.261 2 0.297
– – (0.099) (0.110)
NESEP – – 2 0.113 2 0.093
– – (0.133) (0.148)
GPA – 0.079 0.084 0.108
– (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)
Technical B.A. – 2 0.010 2 0.057 0.035
– (0.061) (0.066) (0.073)
Minority 2 0.246 2 0.219 2 0.236 2 0.069
(0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.129)
Early performance rating – – – 0.014
– – – (0.001)
Constant 1.135 0.913 1.115 0.633
2 2 Log L 2502.3 2495.9 2485.5 1918.9
N 2349 2349 2349 2201
Notes: See Table 2.
graduate school if the program is offered to them. These
preferences are recorded in the data file. A positive stated
preference for graduate school provides a gauge of the
individual’s evaluation of the value of graduate edu-
cation. Moreover, this preference variable should be
strongly correlated with attendance at graduate school
but not with promotion outcomes. Finally, based on the
administrative criteria for selection, the graduate school
model includes proxies for the likelihood of being selec-
ted for the graduate education program. These include
academic preparation (college GPA) and performance in
college mathematics and science courses. Since superior
performance as a junior officer is also an important selec-
tion criterion, the supervisor evaluations variable is
included as a proxy for early-career performance. The
system is identified if at least one variable in the selec-
tion equation is omitted from the structural equation. The
occupational dummies, the preference variable, and the
college performance variables (other than GPA) serve as
the identifying instruments in this case.9
The probit selection model results are displayed in the
table given in Appendix A. For line officers, the coef-
ficients of college math and science background and
early performance ratings are all positive and significant
in the model. Early career evaluations have a direct
effect on promotion as well as an indirect effect
operating through graduate school selection. Individuals
from the line specialties hypothesized to have the highest
cost of attending graduate school (submarine, aviation,
and other line) are less likely to enter the sponsored pro-
gram. Finally, the preference variable is strongly posi-
9 A joint test, based on the likelihood ratios from alternative
model specifications, supported the choice of exclusion restric-
tions.
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Table 4
Coefficient of any master’s degree in single stage and bivariate probit models
1. No controls for 2. Controls for 3.a. Bivariate probit 3.b. Error covariance (r)
ability/performance ability/performance
Line officers 0.376 0.265 0.198 0.124
(0.073)a (0.065) (0.077) (0.033)
[0.098]b [0.065] [0.056] –
Staff officers 0.503 0.376 0.188 0.170
(0.063) (0.073) (0.108) (0.039)
[0.145] [0.089] [0.051] –
aStandard errors in parentheses.
bMarginal effects in brackets.
tively correlated with the decision to undertake advanced
education. For staff officers in column 2 the relationships
are similar except that the sub-specialty dummies are
insignificant.
Column 3a of Table 4 presents the estimated effect
of any M.A. degree in the bivariate probit model. For
comparison purposes, the single-stage results with and
without controls for ability and early-career performance
are reproduced in columns 1 and 2, respectively. The
bivariate probit model provides evidence that a large part
of the promotion effects in the single-stage models are
explained by the selection of more able officers into the
graduate education program. The estimated error covari-
ance in column 3b is positive and significant and the
coefficient of the M.A. is smaller in the bivariate probit
model (compared to single-stage estimates in column 2).
The extent of positive selection appears to differ substan-
tially between the two broad occupational fields. For line
officers, the coefficient of the M.A. in the bivariate probit
model is about 25% smaller than in the single-stage
model that included controls for ability and performance
(column 2). For staff officers, the effect of an M.A. falls
by 50% and the coefficient is significant at only the 0.10
level. In general, the bivariate probit results indicate that
the controls for ability and performance in the single
equation probit (in column 2) do not fully capture the
selection process.10
Of the officers with graduate degrees, the majority
(75.1% of line officers and 70.8% of staff officers)
received them via the Navy’s funded program, which
pays tuition and salary during attendance at graduate
school. Since the funded programs tend to involve more
firm-specific training than civilian programs, a question
arises as to whether the return to an M.A. reflects a return
to general or specific investments. We test this hypoth-
10 To conserve space only the coefficients of the M.A. vari-
able are presented. Changes in the size of the coefficients of
the other control variables in the models are slight between the
single stage and bivariate probit estimates.
esis by omitting non-funded M.A.s from the sample and
comparing individuals with an M.A. from a funded pro-
gram to individuals without degrees. Table 5 displays the
estimated coefficients of the funded M.A. variable. In the
single-stage models the return to a funded M.A. for line
personnel is nearly double what it is for any M.A. in
Table 4, and for staff personnel the return is about 20%
higher. However, the bivariate probit results in Table 5
also highlight the greater positive selection for funded
degrees than for all degrees in Table 4. Whereas positive
selection reduced the return to any M.A. by about one-
third for line officers in Table 4, positive selection
appears to reduce the return for funded degrees by nearly
one-half in Table 5. For staff officers, the return to any
M.A. is reduced by two-thirds in the IV estimates in
Table 4, but the return to a funded M.A. is reduced by
nearly three-quarters in the IV estimates in Table 5.
Thus, it appears that both firm specific and general types
of investments yield a positive return to employees in
this organization.
5. Conclusions
This paper examined the promotion probabilities of
professional and technical Navy officers. Single-stage
estimates indicate that, among those reviewed for up-or-
out promotion to grade 4, promotion probabilities are
10–15 points higher for those with any graduate degree.
For those with degrees obtained via the Navy’s full-time
funded program the differential ranges from 15 to 17
points. However, when instruments that are uncorrelated
with promotion are used to predict graduate degree
status, the results suggest that a sizeable portion of the
relationship between graduate education and promotion
is due to unobserved attributes that lead some people to
attend (or be selected for) graduate school, especially for
the Navy’s program, and to be more promotable. The
selection-corrected estimates of the promotion effect of
graduate education are reduced by between 40 and 50%.
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Table 5
Coefficient of fully-funded master’s degree in single stage and bivariate probit models
1. No controls for 2. Controls for 3.a. Bivariate probit 3.b. Error covariance (r)
ability/performance ability/performance
Line officers 0.605 0.460 0.170 0.221
(0.067)a (0.074) (0.062) (0.037)
[0.148]b [0.093] [0.045] –
Staff officers 0.615 0.440 0.154 0.246
(0.072) (0.086) (0.065) (0.048)
[0.172] [0.101] [0.046] –
aStandard errors in parentheses.
bMarginal effect in brackets.
An important issue is whether the effect of graduate
degrees observed here reflects enhancement of the offi-
cer’s on-the-job productivity or sorting by the firm. At
first glance one might reject the sorting argument
because the information costs that generate the need for
signaling are not as relevant here as they are in the labor
market where employers must assess applicants for entry
level jobs. Rather, this is a personnel system in which
employees have worked for 6 or more years before being
selected for graduate education, and 10 years before
being reviewed for promotion to grade 4. In the tourna-
ment model the firm is assumed to observe productivity
and there is no role for signaling. Nonetheless, screening
may still be valuable to the organization in this situation
because upper levels in the hierarchy require different
skills and greater ability than lower levels. Moreover, it
is difficult for the organization to observe true ability
and this information problem is not entirely solved by
observing performance at the lower levels because the
difference in the skills required in lower and upper level
jobs is so great.
The results in this paper cannot distinguish between
these competing explanations of the observed relation-
ship between graduate degrees and promotion. Nonethe-
less, it appears reasonable to conclude that graduate edu-
cation in this organization works both directly by
augmenting firm-specific skills and by providing a mech-
anism to sort individuals of greatest value to the organi-
zation. Individuals who are more career-oriented and
who perform well within this organization signal these
attributes via their willingness to attend graduate school
and incur the additional costs. Among career-oriented
individuals, the Navy selects those whose early perform-
ance indicates greater potential for jobs at the upper lev-
els of the organization.
A final issue is whether these results would generalize
to the private sector. Recent research suggests that,
except for the up-or-out policy, employment systems of
private firms share key features with the Navy’s hier-
archical system. Analyses of the hierarchical structure of
managerial jobs in a major private firm have identified
the following features identical to the Navy’s system: the
firm has eight hierarchical levels; the average tenure in
the lowest three grades is between 3 and 4 years; grade
level 4 is a crucial choke point for career advancement;
and upper level jobs in the firm (above grade 4) are
characterized as pertaining to general management, man-
aging larger groups, coordinating across units, or stra-
tegic planning (Baker, Gibbs & Holmstrom, 1994a;
Baker, Gibbs & Holmstrom, 1994b).
Especially important are the similar patterns of out-
comes observed in private firms and the Navy. Baker et
al. (1994a,b) confirm that private firms promote only
those with the best relative performance and Bartel
(1995) finds that firms select employees for company-
sponsored training on the basis of their early on-the-job
performance and that the measured productivity of
employees receiving sponsored training exceeds that of
managerial employees not receiving the formal training.
In addition, the selection corrected effect of a master’s
degree acquired after joining the organization on the
probability of promotion in this study is nearly identical
to that obtained by Wise’s study of white collar workers
in a large corporation. These similarities suggest that the
positive relationship between human capital investment
and on-the-job performance observed here may gen-
eralize to civilian firms.
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Appendix A
Table 6
Bivariate probit estimates of graduate school attendance
Variable Line officers Staff officers




Math background 0.402 0.179
(0.074) (0.073)
Science background 0.104 0.356
(0.058) (0.054)
Submarine specialty 2 0.429 –
(0.073) –
Aviation specialty 2 0.271 –
(0.048) –
ROTC program 2 0.095 2 0.167
(0.056) (0.101)
OCS program 2 0.166 2 0.096
(0.067) (0.102)
NESEP program 2 0.263 0.119
(0.120) (0.128)
College GPA 0.212 0.129
(0.025) (0.031)




Age 0.023 2 0.011
(0.012) (0.012)




Married with children 0.079 0.134
(0.057) (0.074)
Divorced with children 2 0.049 2 0.170
(0.179) (0.176)
General line community – 0.136
– (0.116)
Restricted line – 0.101
community
– (0.070)
Constant 2 2.326 2 1.232
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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